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I. INTRODUCTION
A.

Groundwater Law and Technology: Relatively New
Developments in Comparison with the Surface Water
Resource

B.

Research Sources
1. General authorities on water law.
a.

2 W. Hutchins, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 631-756 (U.S. Department of
Agriculture, 1971-1977), relatively current,

e—•

state-by-state analysis of water law.
b.

5 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 407-74 (R. Clark
ed.) (A. Smith Co., 1967), comprehensive,
multi-volume treatise on water law, now
outdated in a few areas.

c.

C. Meyers and A. Dan Tarlock, WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 641-778 (2nd ed.) (Foundation
Press, 1980), casebook on water law.

d.

F. Trelease, WATER LAW 438-539 (3d ed.) (West
Publishing Co., 1979), casebook on water law.

2. Groundwater allocation regimes and the economics of
allocation.
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a.

C. Corker, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION (National Water Comm'n, Legal
Study No. 6) (1971).

b.

Trelease, Conjunctive use of Groundwater and
Surface Water, 273 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst.
1853 (1982).

C. Clark and Arquedas, Developments in
Groundwater Law, 57 Neb. L. Rev. 283 (1978).
d.

Governor's Commission to Review California
Water Rights Law, Final Re p ort 135-169 (1978).

e.

Aiken, Ground Water Mining Law and Policy, 53
U. Colo. L. Rev. 505 (1982).

f.

Loew, Ruedisili and Graham, Beyond Section
858: A Proposed Groundwater Liability and
Mangement System for the Eastern U.S., 8 Ecol.
L. Q. 131 (1979).

g.

Comment, Who Pays When the Well Runs Dry?, 37
U. Colo. L. Rev. 402 (1965).

h.

Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool:
Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 855 (1971).

-2-

II. GROUNDWATER AND THE LAW: RESISTING THE HYDROLOGIC REALITY
A.

The Old Legal Fiction. The early cases often relied on
the legal fiction of two different types of
groundwater. See e.g., Howard v. Perrin, 8 Ariz. 347,
76 P. 460 (1904). One type is percolating groundwater;
the other is water that flows in a defined subterranean
watercourse. However this distinction does not reflect
the hydrologic reality; hydrologically, groundwater can
appropriately be classified as either tributary or nontributary to surface water.

B.

Tributary groundwater is water that is in some way
hydrologically connected to surface water, so that
extraction of this groundwater source would have some
impact upon surface flows.

C.

Non-tributary groundwater is water that is not
hydrologically connected to any surface stream. This
form of groundwater is in reality rare. One commentator
asserts: "most engineers and geologists believe all
water is tributary to some stream, in some quantity, at
some future point in time." Comment, Reasonable Use of
Percolating Groundwater, 13 Ariz. L. Rev. 490, 493
(1971).
Thus, non-tributary groundwater generally refers to
water with a minimal connection to surface streams.
Withdrawing such water would not effect change in a
surface stream, if at all, for a long time and perhaps
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over a great distance. Typically, the recharge rate in
this type of groundwater source is very slow and the
water in the formation has accumulated over a very long
time.
III. THE TRADITIONAL GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION DOCTRINES
A.

Introduction

1. Attempts to establish successful legal regimes for
groundwater allocation have been fraught with
inequities and frustrations. Some courts have
simply abdicated:

The secret, changeable and
unknowable character of underground
water in its operations is so
diverse and uncertain that we cannot
well subject it to the regulations
of the law, nor build upon it a
system of rules, as is done in the
case of surface streams.

Perkins v. Kramer, 148 Mont. 355, 423 P.2d 587, 591
(1966), citing Ryan v. Quinlan, 45 Mont. 521, 532,
124 P 512, 515 (1912).

B.

Absolute Ownership (The English Rule)

1. The rule of absolute ownership, also known as the
English rule, was first formally announced in 1843
in Acton v. Blundell. In Acton, a groundwater
irrigator sued a miner who dried up the irrigator's
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supply. The court held for the miner on two
bases. First, that he had a right to use his land,
which he owned "from the heavens above to the
center of the earth below." Second, the court said
that the way of groundwater is "unknown and
unknowable." This holding was judicially
advantageous in that it terminated the difficult
factual inquiry about what has happened, or is
about to happen, down in the earth.
2. Under the rule of absolute ownership, a landowner
is free to pump unlimited quantities of water, for
any use, with no liability to neighbors. This rule
of no-liability has been applied tenaciously, to
the extent of protecting a malicious landowner
whose sole intent in pumping was to injure an
adjacent neighbor's groundwater supply. Huber v.
Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903),
overruled, State v. Michels Pipeline Construction
Co., 63 Wis. 2d, 278, 217 N.W. 2d 339 (1974). See
also, Drinkwine v. State, 134 Vt. 127, 300 A. 2d
616 (1973).
C. The Rule of Reasonable Use (The American Rule)
1. The rule of reasonable use allows landowners a
usufructory right to the percolating water beneath
their land subject to a reasonable use on the land
from which the water is extracted. See generally,

Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W. 2d 859 (Mo. APP.
1971).
2. "Reasonable use." This phrase relates to the
"beneficial use" feature of appropriative law:
"beneficial use is the basis, the measure and the
limit of the water right." The original
Restatement of Torts, S 860 defined "reasonable" in
the context of riparian use. This context,
however, is often inapt since most reasonable use
states have rejected riparianism. Bristor v.
Cheatham, 75 Ariz. 227, 255 P.2d 173, 175 (1953).

3.

"On the land." The doctrine thus limits uses on
non-overlying lands, uses on lands outside of the
basin, and sales. Under the rule of reasonable
use, water may be extracted and transported "off
the land" so long as no neighbor can show resultant
injury.

4.

So long as the water is reasonably applied on their
land, landowners may extract any amount of water,
even if thereby injuring a neighbor.

D. Correlative Rights

1. This doctrine first appeared in Katz v. Walkinshaw,
141 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663, 74 P. 766 (1902).
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2.

Essentially, the doctrine limits the proprietary
rights of overlying landowners by providing that
when there is an inadequate groundwater supply for
all users of the same underground source, they must
prorate use in proportion to the relative
percentage of land area they own over the
underground source.

3.

The California Supreme Court modified this in
Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Ca1.2d 908, 207 P.2d 17
(1949), where it held that the various users of the
Raymond Basin had established mutually prescriptive
rights as against each other and must share
proportionately in a reduction of the amount to be
pumped.

4.

This rule of Pasadena v. Alhambra was then limited
in Los Angeles v. San Fernando, 14 Ca1.3d 199, 537
P.2d 1250 (1975), where the court held that a
prescriptive right could not be asserted against a
municipality; further, a prescriptive right cannot
run against any nonmunicipal party unless that
party had received adequate notice that a condition
of overdraft existed.

E. The Restatement Rule
The Restatement of Torts (Second), § 858 (1979),
provides as follows:
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(1) A proprietor of land or his grantee
who withdraws ground water from the land
and uses it for a beneficial purpose is
not subject to liability for interference
with the use of water by another, unless
(a) the withdrawal of ground water
unreasonably causes harm to a
proprietor of neighboring land
through lowering the water table or
reducing artesian pressure,
(b) the withdrawal of ground water
exceeds the proprietor's reasonable
share of the annual supply or total
store of ground water, or
(c) the withdrawal of the ground
water has a direct and substantial
effect upon a watercourse or lake
and unreasonably causes harm to a
person entitled to the use of its
water.
(2) The determination of liability under
clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Subsection
(1) is governed by the principles stated
in §S 850 to 857 [regarding riparian
rights].

IV. MODERN LEGISLATIVE ALLOCATION SCHEMES

A. Permit Systems

1.

Legislation is generally based on prior
appropriation. The administrative machinery
requiring permits is of great importance.
Substantive prior appropriation law governing
surface water, however, is sometimes difficult to
apply to groundwater.

2.

The substantive law of prior appropriation:
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a.

"First in time, first in right." Priority
contingent on first use is a major
distinguishing feature.

3.

b.

The requirement of a diversion.

c.

The requirement of beneficial use.

d.

The prohibition against waste.

The principle of priority in time (closing
headgates in inverse chronological order from most
recent junior first to oldest senior last in times
of shortage) is easy to apply to surface streams
where shortage is relatively easy to ascertain.
However, as a factual matter it is much more
difficult to ascertain where there is a groundwater
shortage.

4.

The issue in groundwater appropriation lawsuits is
not a claim of priority to an absolute amount of
water. Rather, the claim is the right to pump
uninfringed at a given pressure level. See Section
V, below.

5.

Several codes deal with the difficult question of
groundwater mining, i.e., when extractions exceed
recharge. Idaho forbids any form of groundwater
mining. I.C. S 42-237a(g). Baker v. Ore-Ida
Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627 (1973).
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Colorado and New Mexico both allow groundwater
mining and acknowledge acquifer depletion is
inevitable. In Colorado, in designated basins a
rate of pumping is allowed that would result in a
40% depletion of the available groundwater over 25
years. C.R.S. 37-90-106. See Fundingsland v.
Colorado Ground Water Comm i n. 171 Colo. 487, 468
P.2d 835 (1970) (administratively-developed threemile test). In non-designated, non-tributary
basins, acquifer longevity of 100 years is
assumed. C.R.S. 37-92-137(4). New Mexico works on
a 40 year life. N.M.S.A. 72-12A-8 (1978).
B. Market Demand Theory
1.

When the implemented allocative scheme fails and
shortage occurs, there are, broadly speaking, two
basic "schools" used for providing relief. One is
the enactment of legislation that proscribes
certain uses and announces what rights attach. See
C, infra. The second school is reliance on the
free market to solve the overdraft problem.

2.

For example, the choice between these two schools
confronted the Arizona legislature before it
enacted the 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management
Act.

3.

Those favoring the market-demand theory argued that
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since much agricultural land had already gone out
of production because the cost of pumping water
from increasing depths had made continued farming
in those areas uneconomical, the combination of
small profit margins and high pumping costs would
result in termination of irrigation pumping long
before acquifer depletion. Further, since most
municipal and industrial users can afford to pump
from deeper levels than can farmers, and since
agriculture had been the largest water user in
Arizona, it was argued that conservation would
occur "naturally" from the operation of the free
market.

4.

Finally, market-demand theory advocates argued that
cities could afford to purchase and retire
agricultural land with developed water rights, so
that the allegedly more valuable uses could expand
without any additional acquifer depletion.

5.

It is notable that in politically conservative
Arizona this alternative was soundly rejected. See
Kyl, The 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act:
From Inception to Current Constitutional Challenge,
53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 471 (1982). See also Town of
Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131 Ariz. 78, 638
P.2d 1324 (1981).

C. Critical Area Legislation

1.

Critical area designation is, in part, an
acknowledgment by a state legislature that, despite
whatever other method of allocation is employed in
the state, extraction is exceeding recharge at a
dangerous rate -- thereby necessitating legislative
intervention.

2.

The legislation typically provides authority for
the state engineer to designate an area (often a
basin) "critical." Once so designated, no new
wells may be installed in the area. However, those
wells existing in the area at the time of the
designation are typically protected, even if when
used they exceed the recharge rate. For an
eloquent attack on this approach see, Southwest
Engineering Co. v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d
764 (1955) (Cameron, C.J. dissenting).

3.

An example of critical groundwater area statutorily
defined:

"Critical groundwater area" is
defined as any groundwater basin, or
designated part thereof, not having
sufficient groundwater to provide a
reasonably safe supply for
irrigation of cultivated lands, or
other uses in the basin at the then
current rates of withdrawal, or
rates of withdrawal projected by
consideration of valid and
outstanding applications and
permits, as may be determined and
designated, from time to time, by
the state reclamation engineer.
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Idaho Code S 42-233(a).
4.

A recurring question here is whether the state
engineer's evidence is sufficient to sustain a
designation of a critical area. See, Tappen v.
Smith, 92 Idaho 451, 444 P.2d 412 (1968).

D. Conjunctive Use
1.

Conjunctive use defined: p [clonjunctive use is the
name applied to several different practices and
processes employed to coordinate the use of ground
and surface water in order to get the maximum
economic benefits from both resources." Trelease,
Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water,
278 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 1853, 1854 (1982).

2.

However, conjunctive use connotes different
meanings in different regions. In California it
has been referred to as the underground storage of
surface water. In Colorado it has been referred to
the legal integration and use of tributary water.
See, Hillhouse, Integrating Ground and Surface
Water Use In An Appropriation State, 20 Rocky Mt.
Min. L. Inst. 691, 692 (1975).

3.

In Colorado, "tributary groundwater" comes under
the same system as surface waters. E.g., C.R.S.
37-92-102(a)(1); Matter of Arkansas River, 581 P.2d
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293 (Colo. 1978); Cache LaPoudre Water Users Ass'n
v. Glacier View Meadows, 191 Colo. 53, 550 P.2d 288
(1976) (example of plan of augmentation).

V. WELL-DEPTH LOWERING: THE ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
A. Introduction

In economic terms, water is most efficiently allocated
and the social welfare maximized when it is consumed to
the point that demand equals marginal cost. The
marginal cost of groundwater has two components. One is
the internal component -- the cost borne by the
pumper. The other is the external component -- the
costs imposed on all other pumping units by this one
unit's decision to pump (e.g. lowering the water table
thereby necessitating well deepening). The demand curve
is a function of the value of the marginal product -and the value is the price of the water multiplied by
the change in amount of water applied. See generaly C.
Meyers and A.D. Tarlock, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 67989 (1979).
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B. Pay Own Costs
One solution to the problem created by a declining
watertable is the rule advocated by the junior
appropriator in Current Creek irr. co.

v.

Andrews, 9

Utah 2d 324, 344 P.2d 528 (1959), that each well user
pays his or her own costs. External costs are ignored.
C.

The Junior Liable Rule

Here, when the junior appropriator causes the water
table to fall, the junior is required to pay not only
his or her own expenses but the increased costs to the
other pumpers caused by the decline in the water table.

This rule, essentially adopted by the Current Creek
court, has been criticized for over-burdening the junior
appropriator with all external costs when the decline in
the water table is a result of the junior's additional
pumping and the established senior's continued
pumping. Were the seniors not to pump when the junior
began, the junior would not have to pump from the lower
depth.
D.

The Rule of Proportionality

An alternative to arbitrary assigning all external costs
to the last junior pumper is the rule of
porportionality. Here each pumper would pay a part of
the external marginal costs in proportion to the
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quantities pumped.
Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property
Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 855
(1971), argues that to achieve an optimal production
rate, the bias toward early production must be
eliminated. This can be achieved through the imposition
of reciprocal externalities by one pumper on another and
assigned "in some manner proportional to every owner's
alloted share of the total volume of the pool, not the
total volume produced in any one time period. . . .The
formula envisions compensatory payments from producers
of earlier units to producers of later units." Id. at
877. Although this theory may come close to pure
optimality, its implementation would likely be
administratively complex and expensive.
VI. WELL-DEPTH LOWERING: SOME ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
A. Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552
(1961). The rule of Bender is that a senior's
groundwater diversion must be reasonable so that the
senior "is not entitled to command the whole or a
substantial flow of the stream merely to facilitate his
taking the fraction of the whole to which he is
entitled. . . .[P]riority of appropriation does not give
a right to an inefficient means of diversion . . . ."

-17--

B.

Maerz v. U.S. Steel Co., 116 Mich. App. 710, 323 N.w.2d
524 (1982).

Plaintiff homeowners sued defendant quarry for lowering
the water level in a well that was plaintiffs' exclusive
source of water. The defendant argued that Michigan
recognized reasonable use for waters extracted and used
"off" the land and also recognized the English (absolute
ownership) rule for waters extracted and used "on" the
land. Since the water extracted from the quarry was
used at the quarry, defendants argued they had an
absolute right to extract at any rate they desired. The
court rejected this argument, holding that extraction of
underground water for a purpose connected with the land
from which it is withdrawn is not per se unactionable.
The Restatement (Second) rule was adopted.
C.

Wiggins v. Brazil Coal and Clay Corp.,
App.

Ind.

, 440 N.E.2d 495 (1982).

Plaintiff lake front property owners sued for damages
and to enjoin defendant mining company from pumping
groundwater out of its mining pits. The defendant's
pumping damaged plaintiffs by lowering the level of the
lake. The court followed the recommendations of the
Restatement of Torts (Second)

858 in determining what

is "reasonable." The court, prompted by the demands of
equity, departed from stare decisis and the traditional
common law rules, and held for the plaintiffs. Since
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the defendant was a mine operation, the court
reasoned: "we have no doubt that it is necessary for
[defendant] to dewater its pits in order to mine coal.
However, a principle of modern law is that a business
should bear its own costs, burdens, and expenses of its
operation because they can be distributed to the
consumer through the price mechanism." 440 N.E.2d at
501. Thus the court departed from long established law
to impose costs on neighboring landowners who extract
groundwater depending on the nature of the landowner.

D. Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978).

Plaintiffs, domestic well-users, sued neighbor
defendants, who extracted groundwater for irrigation.
The court relied upon a user-preference statute giving
first priority to domestic users, then agricultural
users, then manufacturing and industrial users. The
defendant irrigators were required to pay plaintiffs'
increased pumping costs. The court found no preference
or priority between domestic users: "[e]very overlying
owner has an equal right to a fair share of the
underground water for domestic purposes. If [well water
levels are] lowered by other domestic users, plaintiffs
would still be entitled to no relief so long as they
still could obtain water by deepening their wells." The
court left open the question of who pays if an acquifer
is mined.
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E. Baker v. Ore-Ida Foods, Inc., 95 Idaho 575, 513 P.2d 627

(1973)

Although this case is generally recognized for its
holding enunciating the Idaho "no groundwater mining"
rule, it also held that a senior appropriator who is
aggrieved by a junior's pumping must have reasonable
groundwater pumping levels and is not entitled to his or
her historic diversion level. Moreover, the court held
that implicit in the legislative delegation to the Idaho
Department of Water Administration of the function of
ascertaining reasonable pumping levels is the
recognition that such levels may be modified to conform
to changing circumstances. On the other hand, the court
recognized that senior appropriators may enjoin pumping
by juniors where additional pumping of juniors' wells
will exceed the reasonable, anticipated average rate of
future recharge, or where such pumping will force
seniors to go below reasonable pumping levels as set by
the state water department.

VII. CONCLUSION
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